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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Prior research has established that venture capitalists (VCs) and CEOs of their portfolio 
companies often disagree on venture policies. Such disagreements can escalate into cognitive 
conflicts. Relationship-based, or affective, conflict may also arise between VCs and CEOs. 
This paper examines the antecedents and dynamics of such VC-CEO conflicts and their effects 
on CEOs’ expectations as to what financial intermediaries they would like to choose for their 
new ventures. Based on a survey of 104 CEOs of VC-backed ventures, we establish that, 
following conflict with VCs, CEOs may elect to avoid using any financial intermediaries, or to 
choose business angels or corporations as financial intermediaries. Alternatively, CEOs may 
decide that they still want to work with VCs in the future and strive to ameliorate their 
collaboration with VCs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflicts are defined in the literature as 
perceived incompatibilities between the 
parties (Boulding, 1963; Jehn, 1995).  
 
Researchers have emphasized the 
multidimensional nature of conflict  
 
(Pinkley, 1990; Jehn, 1995). The intergroup 
conflict theory divides conflicts into  
cognitive, or task conflicts (conflicts about 
real issues and alternatives), and affective,  
or relationship conflicts (highly emotional 
conflicts frequently prompted by the 
perceived personal frictions) (Priem & 
Price, 1991; Mooney et al., 2007). 
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Cognitive conflicts have long been 
described in the literature as functional 
because creative discussions allow to clear 
the air, help to overcome the tendency for 
groupthink, spur innovation, and 
consequently, improve organizational 
performance. As an example, entrepreneurs 
may differ in their expectations for growth, 
and the importance of such activities as 
formal business planning, perceptions of 
environmental uncertainty, and risk 
preferences (Matthew et al., 2009). The 
same could be true of VCs and 
entrepreneurs. For instance, VCs may be 
likely to emphasize the advantages of 
planning and exhibit greater risk aversion 
and tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity 
than entrepreneurs.  In contrast, affective 
conflicts have long been considered as 
dysfunctional due to their adverse effect on 
team cohesion and collaboration (Amason, 
1996; Ensley et al, 2002). Recently, though, 
researchers have offered a more pessimistic 
view of cognitive conflicts as leading to a 
number of negative consequences, 
especially because they often underlie 
affective conflicts (De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003; Mooney, Holahan, & Amason, 2007). 
 
Both cognitive and affective conflicts may 
arise in the process of collaboration 
between venture capitalists (VCs) and 
CEOs of their portfolio companies 
(Higashide & Birley, 2002; Yitshaki, 2008; 
Forbes, Korsgaard, & Sapienza, 2010). 
Researchers pointed out several pitfalls in 
the VC-entrepreneur relationship that may 
result in such conflicts. First, scholars 
established that insufficient, or inadequate, 
VC assistance may cause CEO 
dissatisfaction with VC support and lead to 
VC-CEO conflicts (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989; Sapienza, 1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994; 
Barney et al., 1996; Higashide and Birley, 
2002; Berg-Utby, Sorheim, Widding., 
2007). Furthermore, research has provided 
evidence that VCs may pay even less 
attention to the venture when they are 
focused on quickly expanding their 
portfolio. As a result, VCs may end up 
financing too many ventures and thus 
diluting their resources (Shepherd, 
Armstrong, and Levesque, 2005; 
Jääskeläinen, Maula, Seppä, 2006). Second, 
studies showed that VC-CEO conflicts may 
arise as a result of the exorbitant cost of VC 
financing compared to that of other 
financial intermediaries (Hsu, 2005; Florin, 
2003; 2005).  This may lead to conflicts of 
interests between VCs and CEOs.  Such 
conflicts may arise when VCs and CEOs 
disagree on venture valuations, particularly 
during the down rounds of investment when 
VCs’ equity stake often skyrockets, whereas 
CEOs’ share plunges (Forbes, Sapienza, & 
Korsgaard, 2010). On these grounds, 
researchers recommended entrepreneurs to 
choose carefully their financial 
intermediaries among VCs, banks, business 
angels and corporations or corporate 
venture capitalists (CVCs) (Ehrlich et al., 
1994; Ueda, 2004; De Bettignies and 
Brander, 2007). 
 
In this paper, we address the question that 
has not been examined in prior research on 
VC-CEO conflict: what lessons do venture 
CEOs draw from their conflicts with VCs? 
Could they decide not to use any financial 
intermediaries?  Could they make the 
resolution to avoid VCs in the future, but 
seek other financial intermediaries, such as 
corporations and private investors? Could 
they become critical of their VCs’ 
performance, but hope that other VCs 
would do a better job? Or could they blame 
themselves, and their own inability to avoid 
conflict escalation?  To answer these 
questions, we conducted a survey of CEOs 
whose ventures had received VC financing 
in the 2000s (before January, 2009).  
Survey was complemented by interviews 
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with CEOs. In addition to answering the 
questions on the survey, the respondents 
provided useful comments that helped us 
better understand the causes and dynamics 
of VC-CEO conflicts.  Luckily, several 
CEOs also volunteered to talk to us and 
provided some background information.  
 
The main contribution of this study is 
showing that VC-CEO conflicts may have a 
strong impact on CEOs’ intentions as to 
whether or not to recruit financial 
intermediaries for their new ventures; what 
intermediaries to use or not to use; and how 
to better adjust their own behavior in the 
future to accommodate VCs’ requests and 
thus avoid conflict escalation causing harm 
to the venture. The paper is organized as 
follows. In the first section, we discuss the 
key causes of VC-CEO conflicts uncovered 
in the preceding literature on the subject. In 
the second section, we unveil our 
theoretical model of the antecedents and 
dynamics of VC-CEO conflicts and CEOs’ 
intentions with regard to using financial 
intermediaries in the future. In the third 
section, we describe our methods and 
sample. In the fourth section, we report and 
discuss the results. In the fifth section, we 
present the conclusions. Finally, in the sixth 
section, we point out the study’s limitations 
and its practical implications for VCs and 
CEOs, and outline directions for future 
research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: REASONS 
FOR CONFLICTS AND 
DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN VCS 
AND ENTREPRENEURS 
 
Prior research has uncovered the three main 
areas of VC-CEO conflicts. The first area 
can be described as “conflicts of interests 
and unfavorable attributions.” Conflicts of 
interest address zero-sum game situations 
when what benefits VCs could hurt CEOs, 
and vice versa. For instance, the higher 
venture’s pre-money valuation, i.e., what it 
is worth before VC capital infusions, the 
better for venture CEOs and the worse for 
VCs.  Naturally, VCs and CEOs fiercely 
argue about pre-money valuations and may 
never reach a consensus. Negative 
attributions refer to biased opinions that 
parties hold with regard to one another.  
Thus, CEOs may view all VCs as short-
term oriented and controlling, whereas VCs 
may view all CEOs as excessively 
committed to the venture and not able to 
soberly define its merits and shortcomings, 
avoiding unnecessary emotions.  
 
Importantly, it is difficult for CEOs to voice 
their actual feelings toward VC support or 
lack thereof because VCs wield significant 
power in the relationship (Sahlman, 1990; 
Wasserman, 2007). As a result, VCs may 
not really know what CEOs think (although 
some VCs may not be particularly 
concerned about CEOs’ actual feelings 
anyway, assuming that a certain degree of 
hostility is unavoidable). Due to 
information asymmetry and imperfect, 
cluttered lines of communication between 
VCs and CEOs, VCs may act in good faith 
and overemphasize some areas of assistance 
that CEOs consider to be less useful while 
providing insufficient support in other areas 
that CEOs may view as absolutely critical 
(Rosenstein et al., 1993; Ehrlich et al., 
1994; Barney et al., 1996).  Furthermore, 
VC support may be insufficient or 
inadequate, due to their multi-tasking, the 
small size of most VC firms, their 
cumbersome hierarchical structure, 
increasing portfolio size, hiring of 
inexperienced recruits lacking operational 
experience, etc. (Gifford, 1997; Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen, 2004; Cumming and Johan, 
2007). In addition, parties’ mutual 
perception as incompetent may be 
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strengthened and reinforced due to rampant 
negative attributions.  
 
Agency conflicts between VCs and CEOs 
(Sahlman, 1990; Shane & Cable, 1997; 
2001; Gompers & Lerner, 2004) arise due 
to the potential for opportunistic behavior 
on both sides (Cumming and Johan, 2007). 
Therefore, agency conflicts also belong in 
this first category of conflicts of interests 
and negative attributions.  Finally, VC-CEO 
conflict may arise due to the greater 
attention apportioned by VCs to other 
ventures in the portfolio.  For example, 
CEOs may believe that VCs spend too 
much time helping their least successful and 
underperforming, or even failing 
companies, (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986; 
Fredriksen et al., 1990; 1997; Elango et al., 
1995) and focus on putting out fires 
(Fredriksen et al., 1990; 1997) while 
neglecting viable ventures. 
 
The second area of VC-CEO conflicts is 
“conflicts of inefficient collaboration.” For 
instance, VCs’ oversight may be too 
intrusive, in CEOs’ opinion, –”they want to 
keep us on a short leash” (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 1990; Jog et al., 1991). In turn, VCs 
commonly believe that CEOs fail to 
communicate relevant information to them 
in a timely manner or even withhold critical 
information on purpose (Sapienza & 
Korsgaard, 1996). Therefore, not only 
agency conflicts, but also collaboration 
problems (Shane & Cable, 1997), could 
explain the reasons why VCs and CEOs are 
in conflict. Low goal congruence between 
VCs and CEOs observed in prior research 
(Sapienza & Gupta, 1994) certainly has to 
do, not only with the discrepancy between 
these allies’ vested interests and 
appropriation concerns (Gulati, 2007) and 
fear of opportunism (Sahlman, 1990; Cable 
& Shane, 2001), but quite simply with 
ineffective communication and 
collaboration. 
 
These multiple reasons for VC-CEO 
conflict uncovered in previous studies allow 
deepening our understanding of the types of 
conflicts that may occur in the VC-CEO 
relationship. For instance, VC-CEO 
cognitive disagreements regarding their 
goals and policy may not only arise as a 
result of having different views on tasks and 
processes, but also because of different 
vested interests and agency problems. In 
turn, affective conflicts between VCs and 
CEOs may crop up not merely because of 
personal frictions and relationship problems 
but also due to ineffective collaboration.  
Finally, cognitive and affective conflicts 
may be closely related: what starts as a 
cognitive conflict may grow to become an 
affective conflict (Higashide & Birley, 
2002) and what begins as an affective 
conflict, may spur cognitive conflict 
(Yitshaki, 2008).  For instance, cognitive 
conflicts may turn into affective conflicts 
because of the way the parties treat one 
another (ineffective communication and 
collaboration). VCs may not properly 
communicate to CEOs the importance of 
generating adequate performance reports 
and making their management objectives 
transparent. As a result, CEOs could view 
such activities as redundant and useless 
(Ehrlich et al., 1994). VCs may also abuse 
their power, encroach upon CEOs’ territory 
(MacMillan et al., 1986) and be trigger-
happy – ready to dismiss CEOs on the spur 
of the moment (Willard et al., 1992; 
Flamholtz, 1994; Wasserman, 2007).  
 
Both VCs’ rigid control and excessive 
interference into venture governance and 
CEOs’ noncompliance, insufficient 
feedback and paranoia with regard to 
imminent VC takeover could instigate VC-
CEO conflicts in the area of inefficient 
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collaboration.  CEOs may feel that the 
transaction and coordination costs of 
operating under VC tutelage are too high, 
fear that VCs will replace them as soon as 
they develop sellable products (Wasserman, 
2003, 2006), express apprehension that VCs 
would usurp their decision making authority 
(Steier & Greenwood, 1995; Botelho & 
Jonathan, 2006), resent VCs for keeping 
them on a tight leash and seizing venture 
governance (MacMillan et al., 1988), and 
object to VCs’ aggressive voice in response 
to unmet expectations (Parkahangas & 
Landstrom, 2006).   
 
The third group of conflicts can be defined 
as “conflicts of VC-CEO mismatch.” Perry 
(1988) described the main types of 
entrepreneurs as a) inventors (interested in 
developing a specific product and reaping 
the financial rewards while leaving venture 
management to others); b) builders 
(preoccupied with creating a viable 
enterprise); and c) innovators (absorbed in 
developing an advanced technology rather 
than a specific business). Respectively, 
Perry (1988) categorized the main types of 
VCs as a) investors (focused on achieving 
fast financial results); b) advisors (top-tier 
VCs that may offer valuable counsel and 
advice if provided sufficient feedback); and  
c) partners (VCs with deep pockets willing 
to support an extensive search for advanced 
technology). Perry (1988) hypothesized that 
conflicts between VCs and CEOs may arise 
if such partner types are mismatched. Thus, 
while the combinations of inventors-
investors, builders-advisors and innovators-
partners, according to Perry (1988), are 
ideal, an alliance between a builder and 
investor could lead to a conflict. Other 
researchers have argued that since the costs 
of VC financing are very high (Hsu, 2005; 
Florin, 2006), CEOs may find a better 
match with other types of financial 
intermediaries, such as business angels 
(Ehrlich et al., 1994), corporations 
(Jääskeläinen et al., 2006) and banks (Ueda, 
2004). In addition, studies have shown that 
venture CEOs may have different needs in 
terms of the required amount of operational 
vs. strategic assistance (Barney et al., 1996; 
Ehrlich et al., 1994). Therefore, some CEOs 
could be better off with specialist VCs 
focusing on operational experience, 
whereas others could need generalist VCs. 
Table 1 sums up our discussion of the 
causes of VC-CEO conflicts in previous 
research. 
 
 
Table 1: The Principal Causes of VC-CEO Conflicts Identified in the Literature 
 
# Causes of Conflict Studies 
I. Conflicts of interest and negative 
attributions: 
 
1. VC support falls far short of CEOs’ 
expectations 
Rosenstein et al., 1989; 1990; 
1993; Flynn, 1991; 1995; Berg-
Utby et al., 2007 
2. VCs’ limited attention and their decreasing 
support for individual ventures as a result of 
portfolio growth leads to CEOs’ 
dissatisfaction with the quality of provided 
advice. 
Gifford, 1997; Shepherd et al., 
2005; Jääskeläinen et al., 2006; 
Cumming & Johan, 2007 
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3. VCs and CEOs disagree as to the areas in that 
VC support should be increased or decreased 
McMillan et al., 1986; Ehrlich et 
al., 1994; Barney et al., 1996 
4. Parties disagree based on their vested interests 
on pace of growth, timing and modes of exit 
Jog et al., 1991; Ehrlich et al., 
1994; Wright & Robbie, 1998 
5. Agency conflicts: CEOs’ incompetence, 
shirking, opportunistic actions, hold-up 
threats, moral hazard, overspending 
Sahlman, 1990; Jog et al., 1991; 
Shane & Cable, 1997; 2001; 
Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2004; Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004; Parkahangas & 
Landstrom, 2006 
6. VCs spend too much time supporting troubled 
ventures, and thus, do not have enough time 
for more viable companies 
Timmons & Bygrave, 1986; 
Fredriksen et al., 1990; 1997; 
Elango et al., 1995 
 
7. CEOs view VCs as incompetent, especially in 
the areas of venture management and 
operations, and contributing to venture failure 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (1990); 
Gabrielsson & Huse, 2001 
 
8. VCs view CEOs as an annoyance and even as 
a selfish and destructive force 
Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; 
Willard et al, 1992 
9. VCs and CEOs make different attributions  Zacharakis et al., 1999 
II. Conflicts of inefficient collaboration:   
1. Low goal congruence between VCs and 
CEOs 
Sapienza, 1989; Sapienza & 
Timmons, 1989; Sapienza & 
Gupta, 1994; 
2. VC support could be counterproductive due to 
its rigid nature, and hence, adverse effect on 
innovation 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 1990; Barney 
et al., 1996; Higashide & Burley, 
2002; Wijbenga et al., 2007 
3. Cognitive disagreements (about goals and 
policy) and personal or affective frictions  
Higashide & Burley, 2002 
 
4. CEOs object to the time spent in generating 
performance reports and fulfilling other VC 
requirements 
Ehrlich et al., 1994; Jog et al., 1990 
5. CEOs criticize VCs for masterminding and 
monopolizing some of their activities and 
acting dictatorially 
MacMillan et al., 1986; 
6. VCs believe that founder-CEOs should rather 
be replaced  
Willard et al., 1992; Hellmann & 
Puri, 2002; Kaplan & Stromberg, 
2004; Wasserman, 2007;  
7. CEOs fear loss of flexibility and decision-
making authority 
Barney et al., 1996; Botelho & 
Jonathan, 2006 
8. CEOs bemoan the increased transaction and 
coordination costs 
Steier & Greenwood, 1995; 
Botelho & Jonathan, 2006 
9. CEOs object to VCs’ inconsiderate and 
aggressive behavior 
Sapienza, 1989; Parkahangas & 
Landstrom, 2006;  
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III. Conflicts due to VC-CEO mismatch:  
1. VCs and CEOs choose the wrong type of 
partner 
Perry, 1988 
2.  CEOs would be better off with private 
investors 
Freear & Wetzel, 1990; Ehrlich et 
al., 1994; Osnabrugge, 1998 
3. CEOs would be better off with more 
experienced VCs 
Sweeting, 1991; Sapienza et al., 
1994; Smith, 2001 
4. CEOs would be better off with more (less) 
operations-focused VCs 
Ehrlich et al., 1994; Barney et al., 
1996 
5. CEOs could be better off with corporate 
investors 
Maula et al., 2005 
6. CEOs could be better off with borrowing 
from banks 
 
Florin, 2000; Hsu, 2005 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Antecedents of Cognitive Conflicts 
between VCs and CEOs 
Prior research has examined the distribution 
of attention inside the VC firm (Gifford, 
1997) and the impact of VCs’ increasing 
portfolio on the amount of attention 
allocated to individual ventures 
(Kanniainen, Keuschnigg, 2003; 2004).  In 
addition, we suggest taking a closer look at 
the other side of the coin – the distribution 
of attention inside the entrepreneurial 
venture. The attention-based view of the 
firm (Ocasio, 1997; De Clercq, Castaner, 
Belausteguigoita, 2006) suggests that 
organizations selectively approach issues as 
important or less important. These 
preferences are situated in the 
organization’s procedural and 
communication channels and may be reified 
through cultural symbols, routines and 
interactions among organizational members. 
Moreover, attention is structurally 
distributed throughout an organization so 
that organizational members are responsible 
for performing specific functions and roles 
integrated into clusters of activities (De 
Clercq et al., 2007). 
 
When VCs take over, they may actively 
 
interfere with the existing distribution of 
attention in the entrepreneurial venture by 
introducing new sets of priorities. VCs  
typically request that a company changes 
itstemporal orientation by focusing on  
short-term reporting periods geared toward 
the accomplishment of certain preset goals  
defined as milestones (Jog et al., 1991; 
Gompers & Lerner, 2004). This change in  
the firm’s temporal orientation and 
respective reporting procedures clearly 
represents a departure from prior 
organizational rhythms emphasizing 
exploration, that is, search for new 
knowledge. Exploration and exploitation 
are different activities that companies find 
difficult to combine, and hence prefer to 
switch between the two modes (Siggelkow 
& Rivkin, 2006). VCs seek to reorient a 
venture from exploration to exploitation by 
isolating an area of activity that is most 
likely to be successfully commercialized, 
and directs CEO’s attention to such 
promising area to the exclusion of others. 
This could lead to a sea change in a 
venture’s strategy. While founders often 
endorse a broader strategy of exploration, 
VCs insist on narrowing a venture’s focus 
and pursuing a strategy of exploitation to 
expedite the launch of a promising product. 
Concomitantly, VCs insist on greater 
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accountability and coordination. These 
changes could be momentous and require 
some adjustment and fine-tuning. 
 
Although VCs may desire to redirect the 
process of distribution of attention inside a 
venture by changing its temporal 
orientation, focus, strategy and patterns of 
coordination, they may not, in fact, have 
enough time, or even sufficient knowledge 
and expertise, to assist a venture in 
implementing such far-reaching 
transformations.  As a result, CEOs may 
feel that they have not been provided 
enough guidance, and begin to doubt VCs’ 
competence as agents of change (since the 
latter may not possess the knowhow as to 
ways in which the requested changes in the 
venture’s system of activities can be 
implemented given its resources and 
capabilities). To sum up, CEO’s perception 
of the efficacy of VC support may be 
related to VCs’ ability to assist CEOs in 
reallocating their attention so that CEOs 
would be able to efficiently manage the 
transition. 
 
In the first section, we have summarized the 
main sources of VC-CEO conflicts 
identified in research. Previous studies have 
shown that VC-CEO conflicts could stem 
from various causes. Some of them can be 
described as cognitive. For instance, VCs 
and CEOs may disagree on the strategic 
direction of the venture if CEOs are more 
focused on exploration and VCs are more 
concerned about exploitation of the 
discovered opportunities. In addition, VCs 
and CEOs may disagree about the pace of 
venture financing. While VCs practice 
staged investment to maintain maximum 
control over the venture and be able to save 
resources if it transpires that a venture is 
going to fail, CEOs may desire a more 
concentrated investment received in a 
shorter period of time and fear that 
insufficient capitalization would put them at 
a disadvantage compared to the competition 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 1990; Jog et al., 1991). 
Finally, VCs and CEOs often disagree in 
regards to the projected exit strategy. While 
CEOs often want to retain the venture as a 
standalone enterprise, VCs may prefer to 
sell it sooner to provide the liquidity for 
their own investors (Harris, 2010). 
 
Thus, cognitive disagreements between 
VCs and CEOs regarding venture strategy, 
financing and projected exit may be quite 
significant. Such cognitive conflicts could 
also be affected by CEOs’ concern about 
VCs’ insufficient support. Prior studies 
have shown that VCs’ attention is limited 
(Gifford, 1997), and may not be distributed 
effectively (Sapienza & Timmons, 1989; 
Shepherd et al., 2005). Furthermore, VC 
attention may be diluted due to quick 
portfolio growth (Cummings and Johan, 
2007; Haagen, 2008). It is also known that 
CEOs often feel frustration with insufficient 
levels of VC support and attribute it to VCs’ 
lack of experience in venture operations 
(Ehrlich et al., 1994; Barney et al., 1996). 
Finally, CEOs may become frustrated if 
they feel that their VCs have failed to help 
them with venture restructuring: while 
CEOs are required to change the way they 
apportion attention inside a venture by 
switching from exploration to exploitation, 
VCs may fail to assist CEOs in this 
transition. Hence, ineffective VC support 
(from a CEO’s perspective) could add fuel 
to cognitive conflicts between VCs and 
CEOs.  To summarize: 
 
H1: CEOs’ view of VC support as  
insufficient will be associated with 
CEOs’ perception of the existence 
of cognitive conflicts between VCs 
and CEOs focused on venture 
strategy. 
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Perceived Lack of 
Attention from Lead 
VC
% Equity Owned by 
Lead VC
Cognitive 
Conflict
H1
H2
Affective 
Conflict
H3
Behavioral Intention 
to Switch to Another 
Funding Source
Behavioral Intention 
to Change Own 
Behavior 
H4
H5
The Impact of VCs’ Equity Share on 
Cognitive Conflicts between VCs and 
CEOs 
VCs and CEOs actively negotiate before 
signing a contract as to what share of 
venture equity VCs will receive in exchange 
for their capital (Sahlman, 1990; Bell, 
2009). Studies have shown that top-tier VC 
firms’ support could be 10-14% more 
expensive (in terms of venture equity used 
to purchase it) compared to other VC firms 
(Hsu, 2005). Some VC, for instance, 
Perkins from the famous KP, have argued 
that it is irrelevant how much equity 
entrepreneurs agree to sell in the beginning 
because very few ventures will need money 
just for the first round of investment. 
Typically, ventures come back for more 
capital.  Moreover, with each new round of 
financing, entrepreneurs’ share dwindles 
and VCs’ share increases. In this sense, the 
share of equity owned by VCs is related not 
only to VCs’ bargaining power at the outset, 
but also to the venture’s subsequent need in 
more capital and VCs’ increasing equity 
share in the course of financing.  
 
Obviously, as VCs acquire a greater and 
greater share of venture’s equity, their 
ability to influence the venture’s strategic 
direction increases. VCs’ rising influence 
on the venture may exacerbate the cognitive 
disagreements between VCs and CEOs as 
VCs begin acting more imperially and 
impose their strategic vision on CEOs. VCs, 
of course, do not run portfolio companies  
(except for the rare situations when VCs 
become interim CEOs). CEOs are still 
responsible for solving operational 
questions, but VCs’ rising power could 
make CEOs more dependent on VCs so that 
CEOs would need VCs’ approval on a wide 
range of operational issues. Put on a shorter 
leash, CEOs may resist VCs’ tight control 
leading to greater cognitive conflicts. To 
summarize:  
 
H2: VCs’ equity share will be 
associated with cognitive conflicts 
between VCs and CEOs. 
 
Cognitive Conflicts vs. Affective Conflicts 
Recent research has emphasized the idea of 
conflict transformation over time. For 
instance, process conflicts occurring at early 
stages of a relationship may have a negative 
and long-lasting impact (Greer et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, conflicts may influence one 
another. Purportedly, cognitive conflicts 
may mediate the eruption of affective 
conflicts (Mooney et al., 2007). While 
affective conflicts are associated with 
relationship problems (Behfar et al., 2008), 
we believe that such conflicts may also 
stem from perceived injustices and 
improprieties attributed to certain roles and 
structural positions, rather than to 
individuals per se. For instance, it is 
Figure 1: Research Model 
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possible that subordinates may resist the 
idea of being subjected to compliance 
procedures as not quite rational or 
humiliating, even though they do not have 
any personal problems with the particular 
supervisors. Therefore, while cognitive 
conflicts may relate to disagreements 
regarding goals and policies (Higashide and 
Burley, 2002), affective conflicts may arise 
in response to perceived inequities. 
 
The second group of conflicts we identified 
in prior research could be especially 
conducive to the emergence of affective 
conflicts between VCs and CEOs. Thus, 
CEOs may become very emotionally 
involved and even agitated when discussing 
VCs’ rigid control and interference with the 
venture (Cumming & Johan, 2007; Haagen, 
2008). CEOs may also fear that they could 
be fired simply because VCs do not believe 
that they can learn how to manage a venture 
quickly enough (Willard et al., 1992; 
Flamholtz, 2004; Khanin et al., 2008). VCs, 
though, may feel that procedural justice has 
been violated if CEOs fail to provide them 
with needed information in a time manner 
(Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996). Thus, 
collaboration failures can lead to strong 
emotional repercussions. VCs and CEOs 
may develop strong cognitive 
disagreements due to their discrepant vested 
interests that could be exacerbated by 
CEOs’ view of VC support as insufficient.  
Cognitive conflicts, in turn, may result in 
affective conflicts if VCs and CEOs fail to 
address their collaboration problems. As a 
result, both parties may feel that procedural 
justice and their implicit psychological 
conflicts have been violated by rude, 
inconsiderate or indifferent partners 
(Parkahangas & Landstrom, 2006).  
 
Thus, affective conflicts can be related to 
perceptions of fairness: both VCs and CEOs 
may feel that they have acted in good faith 
and regard insufficient partner collaboration 
as unjust and offensive. The issue of control 
could become especially divisive due to 
VCs’ insistence on tight oversight 
combined with the failure to provide 
substantial help that VCs may need to 
change their attention allocation patterns. 
Finally, VCs and CEOs may be 
inconsiderate and thus thwart collaboration. 
That may lead to escalation of conflict 
when the parties begin to view each other as 
a “selfish and destructive force” (Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1989) that can potentially hurt the 
new venture. This is why intense cognitive 
conflicts between CEOs and VCs may have 
adverse consequences. They may contribute 
to CEOs’ feelings of anxiety and insecurity 
resulting in the perceived incompatibility 
between VC governance and CEOs’ need to 
run their ventures most effectively. In turn, 
CEOs’ inability to collaborate may cause 
equal dissatisfaction on the part of VCs. To 
summarize: 
 
H3: Cognitive conflicts between 
VCs and CEOs will be associated 
with affective conflicts. 
 
VC-CEO Affective Conflicts and CEOs’ 
Plans for the Future 
Venture capital may or may not represent 
the best choice of financing for 
entrepreneurs depending on their objectives, 
venture characteristics and other 
circumstances (Maula et al., 2005). First, 
recent findings indicated that those founders 
that have resorted to VC funding have 
generated less wealth for themselves post-
IPO (Florin, 2005). On these grounds, 
Florin (2005) concluded that entrepreneurs 
primarily motivated by wealth creation for 
themselves – inventors in Perry’s (1988) 
classification – could be better off if they 
received financing from other financiers 
than VCs. Ehrlich et al. (1994) compared 
VCs and private investors (PIs) in terms of 
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CEOs’ perception of the value of these 
intermediaries’ assistance, and established 
that while some CEOs appreciated the 
disciplining role of VC supervision, more 
seasoned entrepreneurs believed that it 
could be redundant and even suffocating. 
Maula et al. (2005) similarly contrasted 
CEOs’ views on venture assistance 
provided by VCs in comparison to 
corporate venture capitalists (CVs). Other 
studies have examined the relative costs and 
benefits of receiving support from VCs as 
opposed to banks (Ueda, 2004). Finally, 
many studies have emphasized that 
different VC types exists (Elango et al., 
1995) so that CEOs that are more selective 
in their choice of suitable types of VC firms 
as financiers could achieve greater 
satisfaction with VC assistance (Smith, 
2001). 
 
In considering possible sources of financing 
for their future ventures, CEOs (especially 
seasoned CEOs with successful track 
records) may have a number of choices. 
They could, in fact, avoid getting involved 
with VCs and choose instead to finance a 
venture on their own, or obtain financing 
from banks, private investors, corporate 
investors, etc. If seasoned CEOs decide to 
avoid VCs, this is certainly not a desirable 
outcome for VCs who prefer to deal with 
experienced entrepreneurs because the odds 
of their ventures achieving success are 
usually much higher (Hsu, 2005, 2007). 
Clearly, affective conflicts with VCs could 
steer CEOs in the direction of alternative 
sources of financing. On the other hand, 
CEOs may also reevaluate their own 
behavior and seek to improve their partner 
selection techniques, as well as to enhance 
the efficacy of their collaboration with VCs. 
Sapienza and Gupta (1994) showed the 
importance of openness and frequency of 
communication between VCs and CEOs for 
resolving their conflicts. CEOs could also 
seek more experienced VCs in the future 
that would be able to furnish quality 
assistance to their companies. Finally, 
CEOs might decide to work harder on 
resolving conflicts with VCs; be alert to 
VCs’ needs and provide requisite 
information to VCs in a timely fashion 
(Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996; Sapienza et 
al., 2001), as well as become proactive in 
building their professional relationships 
with VCs in order to prevent conflict 
eruption and enhance collaboration. To 
summarize: 
 
H 4a: Affective conflicts will be  
associated with CEOs’ expectation 
that they would be more likely to 
use other types of financiers than 
VCs and/or other VCs to fund their 
future ventures. 
 
H4b: Affective conflicts will be 
associated with CEOs’ expectation 
that they would become more 
active in building collaboration 
with VCs for the sake of conflict 
prevention and resolution. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
Procedure and Sample 
Before launching our research project, we 
conducted a pilot study to identify both the 
common areas of disagreement between 
VCs and CEOs of portfolio companies and 
how CEOs may react to their conflicts with 
VCs in terms of their future choice of 
financing. Using Venture Xpert, a database 
of entrepreneurial ventures and VC firms 
maintained by Thompson Financial, we 
downloaded the entire population of 
ventures located in California that have 
received VC assistance from 2000 to 2008. 
Subsequently, an email was sent to 750 
CEOs of companies residing in the 
neighboring counties with the request to 
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take part in a survey.  The message 
contained a link to an online questionnaire. 
Overall, we obtained a random sample 
totaling 104 CEOs resulting in a 13% 
response rate. The majority of the 
respondents were men (91%).  The vast 
majority had a master’s degree (48%) or a 
college degree (34%). Only one person had 
no college education. Seventeen individuals 
held PhDs. The sample included ventures at 
different stages of development in terms of 
the classification used by Venture Xpert 
(from seed to bridge to acquisition) and 
with varying performance levels. Thus, 27 
companies were in initial stages, 54 in an 
expansion phase, 8 in “bridge” phase, and 
the remaining 14 were being acquired by 
competitors. The majority of ventures were 
not yet profitable (70.2%). However, the 
remaining 28.2% have already attained 
profitability. Only 6.8% of CEOs reported 
that they have achieved all the milestones 
set by VCs.  Many more CEOs reported that 
their ventures have accomplished most of 
the VCs’ milestones (60.2%). 33% of CEOs 
wrote they have met only some of their 
milestones.  Further characteristics of the 
CEOs and their companies are given in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 45.22881 6.172396 33 65 
Gender 1.08526 0.2793357 1 2 
Education 2.176782 0.6809352 1 3 
Experience 22.2341 5.198991 10 40 
 Industry Ys 15.11224 6.874533 3 38 
Technology Ys  7.660886 8.481682 2 38 
Same team Ys 3.140173 1.18509 1 7 
Prior ventures 2.604528 3.896883 0 20 
Growth rate 22.30778 143.0371 0 1000 
VC Equity % 30.8797 11.5851 16 70 
Employees 65.43304 54.08007 0 300 
The Survey 
In order to test hypothesis 1, we included 
questions in our survey that were related to 
the perceived insufficient (or lacking) 
attention on the part of VCs allocated to the 
venture (from a CEO’s perspective). 
Specifically, we used two items: 1) We feel 
that our VCs have not spent enough time 
on-site and 2) We feel that our VCs have 
not spent enough time answering our 
questions. Although we repeated these two  
 
questions both for lead VCs and non-lead 
VCs, only lead VCs were retained for data 
analysis since CEOs indicated that non-lead 
VC support was less relevant. CEOs were 
instructed to answer the questions using the 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (highly 
disagree) to 7 (highly agree). We also 
constructed the three questions for the 
survey testing the emergence of cognitive 
conflicts between VCs and CEOs. All these 
items are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3: The Measurement Instrument 
 
Construct Items Text 
Behavioral 
Intention to 
Switch to 
Another Funding 
Source 
BIS1 Your venture would be better off had you avoided getting 
involved with VCs 
BIS2 Your venture would be better off had you chosen VCs more 
carefully 
BIS3 Your venture would be better off had you selected more 
experienced VCs 
BIS4 Your venture would be better off had you worked with VCs 
who had more operational experience 
 
Behavioral 
Intention to 
Change Own 
Behavior  
 
BIC1 
 
Your venture would be better off had you have been more 
proactive in building your relationship with the VC/s 
BIC2 Your venture would be better off had you have worked more 
actively on resolving conflicts and disagreements with the 
VC/s 
BIC3 Your venture would be better off had you have been more 
attentive to the VC/s’ requests 
Affective 
Conflict 
AC1 Our discrepancies with VCs concerned mostly fairness 
issues 
AC2 Our discrepancies with VCs concerned mostly control issues 
AC3 Our discrepancies with VCs concerned mostly relationship 
issues 
Cognitive 
Conflict 
CC1 Our discrepancies with VCs concerned mostly strategic 
decisions 
CC2 Our discrepancies with VCs concerned mostly exit decisions 
CC3 Our discrepancies with VCs concerned mostly financing 
decisions 
Perceived Lack 
of Attention  
LA1 We feel that the VC/s have not spent enough time on-site 
LA2 We feel that the VC/s have not spent enough time answering 
our questions 
% Equity Owned 
by Lead VC 
PE1 % of the venture that is owned by the lead VC? 
 
Based on prior research, we established that 
cognitive conflicts between VCs and CEOs 
center on venture strategy (Rosenstein et al., 
1993), and financing and exit (Sahlman, 
1990; Higashide & Burley, 2002). The 
included items represent these three areas of 
cognitive discord that may arise due to 
parties’ divergent views on venturing 
(exploration vs. exploitation) and discrepant 
interests (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994; Shane & 
Cable, 1997; Cumming & Johan, 2007). In 
contrast, we used the items related to 
fairness, control and relationship issues to 
test affective, relationship-based conflicts 
since affective disagreements typically have 
to do with the perceived violations of 
equity, procedural justice, and implicit 
psychological contracts between VCs and 
CEOs (Parkahangas & Landstrom, 2006). 
The item measuring percentage of equity 
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currently used by VCs was included in the 
questionnaire. Percentage of VC vs. CEO 
equity, as we argued earlier, reflects the  
bargaining power of VCs at the outset, as 
well as their commonly increasing influence  
over the venture as more capital is 
transferred from VCs, and respectively,  
they become the de facto (and de jure) 
owners of the venture. While we were 
concerned about getting responses to the 
question, all CEOs replied and clearly did 
not perceive this information as too private. 
CEOs’ behavioral intention to switch to 
another funding source was measured first 
of all with the question concerning a 
possible avoidance of VC support in the 
future since CEOs do have alternatives 
(Hsu, 2005; Florin, 2005). In addition, we 
tested VCs’ intention to seek more 
experienced VCs, and VCs with greater 
operational experience since CEOs often 
express their disenchantment with less 
experienced VCs (often recent recruits) 
lacking knowledge of venture management 
(Ehrlich et al., 1994; Barney et al., 1996). 
Finally, we tested CEOs’ intention to 
choose VCs more carefully since prior 
research indicated that CEOs that do more 
search feel happier with their choices 
(Smith, 2001). The intention to change their 
own behavior was measured with items that 
emphasized some possibilities for 
preventing conflicts from happening by 
being proactive in building a relationship 
with VCs from the outset, the positive 
effects of resolving conflicts as they arise, 
and responding in a timely fashion to VCs’ 
requests in order to build collaboration.  
These items were generated based on the 
previous research on VC-CEO collaboration 
(Jog et al., 1991; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 
1996; Sapienza et al., 2001).  
 
Data Analysis and Results 
Several analyses were conducted prior to  
testing the hypotheses with the structural 
model. The viability of the model’s 
constructs was assessed using (1) reliability 
estimates (Chrobach’s Alphas), inter-
construct correlations, and descriptive 
statistics, and (2) a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) procedure that employs 
Anderson and Gerbing’s two-step approach 
for estimating structural equation models 
(Anderson et al. 1988).  
 
As one can see in Table 4, there is sufficient 
variation in the constructs, and the item-to-
total correlations for all constructs exceed 
the recommended cutoff point of 0.35 
(Fornell et al. 1981). The Cronbach’s 
alphas, for almost all constructs, exceeded 
the commonly used cutoff of 0.7, thus 
demonstrating reasonable consistency and  
reliability. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
Cognitive Conflict was slightly below the 
0.7 threshold, but removing items could  
not have increased this value. Thus, all 
itemsfor this construct were retained. 
Overall, it was concluded that constructs are 
sufficiently consistent and reliable, and that 
they have ample variation for statistical 
modeling. 
Second, a CFA model was specified and 
estimated, as the first-step in the Anderson 
and Gerbing’s procedure (Anderson et al. 
1988), using the structural equation 
modeling facilities of AMOS. The model 
included the six constructs that were 
allowed to freely correlate with each other.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, the fit statistics 
for this model were adequate and met the 
recommended cutoff values.  
 
Particularly, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
and Incremental Fit Index (IFI) values of  
over 0.95, combined with Root Mean  
Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
below 0.08 indicate good fit (Hu et al. 
1999). The RMSEA in our case 
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Table 4: Constructs’ Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, and Correlations 
 
* p < 0.05   ** p < 0.01
 
is significantly below 0.05 (p-close < 
0.058), which further indicates an excellent 
fit. In addition, the model passed all the 
condition-9 tests (Kelloway 1998: 28-29) 
since all the factor loadings were significant 
at p <0.00.Given the viability of the CFA  
 
 
model as demonstrated by its adequate fit 
indices and significant factor loadings, it 
was concluded that the structural model can 
be assessed. This model was therefore 
specified and estimated with AMOS. The fit 
statistics for this model are also outlined in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Fit Indices for the CFA and Structural Models 
 
  χ2 df p-val χ2/df IFI TLI CFI RMSEA 
p-
Close 
CFA Model  
(Step  1) 109.2 90 0.08 1.21 
0.9
8 0.97 0.98 0.045 0.58 
Research Model  
(Step 2) 131.2 98 0.01 1.34 
0.9
6 0.95 0.96 0.057 0.31 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range of 
Item-to-
Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Behavioral 
Intentions 
to Switch 
4.49 1.75 0.57 – 
0.81 
0.87      
Behavioral 
Intentions 
to Change 
Behaviors 
4.63 1.68 0.79 – 
0.85 
0.54** 0.90     
Affective 
Conflict 
4.60 1.65 0.76 – 
0.85 
0.46 ** 0.49** 0.89    
Cognitive 
Conflict 
4.28 1.34 0.43 – 
0.50 
0.54** 0.38** 0.66** 0.68   
Percived 
Lack of 
Attention   
5.19 1.75 0.66 – 
0.66 
0.49** 0.38** 0.35** 0.35** 0.79  
% Equity 
Owned by 
Lead VC 
33.82 19.41 NA 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.03 1.00 
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Figure 2. Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Structural Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < 0.1   ** p < 0.01   ***p < 0.001 
 
As can be seen, the model has an adequate 
fit, as the fit indices meet the 
abovementioned criteria (CFI & IFI >0.95, 
RMSEA< 0.05, factor loadings significant 
at p < 0.001). The model, standardized path   
coefficients and their levels of significance, 
correlations, and variance explained in 
endogenous constructs (SMC = Squared 
Multiple Correlations) are depicted in 
Figure 2.  
 
To conclude, H1 and H2 posited 
respectively that the cognitive conflict 
between the CEO of a VC-backed company 
and the lead VC will be associated with 
insufficient VC attention, and the percent of 
equity owned by the lead VC. H1 received 
strong support (p < 0.001).  In contrast, H2  
received only marginal support (p < 0.1). 
However, the two hypothesized effects 
explain together 33% of the variation in 
cognitive conflict. H3 was also supported at 
p < 0.001.  As conjectured, cognitive 
conflicts were also strongly associated with 
affective conflicts explaining 59% of the 
variation in affective conflict. H4 and H5 
posited that the consequences of affective 
conflict can be (1) increased intention to 
switch to other funding sources, and (2) 
augmented intention to modify one’s 
behavior and prevent or resolve conflicts 
with VCs, respectively. Both hypotheses 
were supported at p < 0.001.  Affective 
conflict explained 30% of the variation in 
financing intentions and 31% of the 
variation in CEOs’ intention to improve 
their relationship with VC, respectively. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main purpose of this paper was to 
examine the question that has been 
overlooked in the extant research on VC- 
CEO conflict (Higashide & Birley, 2002 
Forbes et al., 2010): Do CEOs change their 
intentions in terms of seeking particular 
types of financial intermediaries for their 
future endeavors in the wake of conflict 
with VCs in their previous ventures? This 
paper’s main contribution lies in 
demonstrating that, in reaction to conflict 
with VCs in their prior encounters, CEOs 
are likely to exhibit a wide range of 
behavioral intentions with regard to their 
choice of financial intermediaries going into 
the future. Specifically, some VCs may 
express the desire not to use any financial 
intermediaries; others may exhibit 
preference for business angels and CVCs 
rather than VCs; and still others could retain 
their previous intent to seek VCs as 
financial intermediaries, but also make the 
resolution to adjust their own behavior to 
avoid conflicts in the future. 
;
Perceived Lack 
of Attention 
from Lead VC 
% Equity Owned 
by Lead VC 
Cognitive 
Conflict 
Affective 
Conflict 
Behavioral Intention 
to Switch to Another 
Funding Source 
Behavioral 
Intention to 
Change Own 
Behavior 
0.54 *** 
0.18 * 
0.77 ***
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The second contribution of this study is that 
it emphasizes, following some recent 
research (Zacharakis et al., 2010), the 
negative aspects of conflict, including 
cognitive conflicts frequently described in 
prior studies solely in positive terms 
(Higashide & Birley, 2002; Yitshaki, 2008).  
Previous researchers have approached 
cognitive conflicts from a positive 
perspective as genuine disagreements 
regarding venture policies that could lead to 
finding creative solutions for the benefit of 
the venture (Higashide & Birley, 2002; 
Yitshaki, 2008).  In contrast, we argued that 
cognitive conflicts can be influenced by 
parties’ vested interests, including their 
equity stake in the venture that could 
seriously aggravate such conflicts. VCs’ 
equity stake is heavily negotiated before 
VCs and entrepreneurs enter their 
relationship (Sahlman, 1989; De Bettignies 
& Brander, 2006) and may further be 
changed multiple times  depending on the 
degree of success of the venture and its 
need for new financing, often putting the 
entrepreneur at a disadvantage (Forbes et 
al., 2010).  Not surprisingly, the divergent 
vested interests of VCs and entrepreneurs 
may underlie what appears on the surface as 
bona fide disagreements about venture 
strategies. The negative aspects of affective 
conflict arise not only due to the fact that 
relationships between VCs and CEOs of 
VC-financed ventures may seriously 
deteriorate as a result of personal frictions 
(Jehn, 1995; 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). 
The negative aspects of affective conflicts, 
as we argue in this study, could also be due 
to the fact that either one, or even both, of 
the partners may believe that their 
expectations regarding procedural justice 
and fairness have been violated 
(Parhankangas and Landstrom, 2006; 
Sapienza et al., 2000). 
 
Overall, this study shows that conflicts 
between VCs and CEOs should be 
approached seriously due to their 
potentially negative effect on VC-CEO 
collaboration and venture performance. 
Even cognitive conflicts should not be 
disregarded as being entirely positive or 
functional, but rather analyzed as possible 
symptoms of unfair equity distribution, 
ineffective collaboration or partner 
mismatch. Moreover, it is critical to follow 
the evolution of cognitive conflicts to avoid 
their escalation into even more intense 
affective conflicts that could make further 
collaboration between VCs and CEOs all 
but impossible. VCs also need to change 
their attitude toward conflicts as being only 
natural (Zacharakis et al., 2010) and be 
more alert toward the possible negative 
effect of conflict on their reputation, and 
hence, the quantity and quality of deals 
available to them in the future. Based on 
this research, CEOs also need to be very 
selective in their choice of financial 
intermediaries, as well as seek to ameliorate 
their own collaboration strategy. 
 
LIMITATIONS  
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
IMPLICATIONS 
  
This study has some limitations. The reader 
should be aware of these limitations as they 
could affect interpretation of the results. 
First, many of our measures were based on 
CEOs’ inherently subjective and emotional 
evaluations made in the wake of conflict 
with regard to VCs’ perceived unfairness 
and intentions to choose to not to choose 
certain financial intermediaries in the 
future. Similar to other researchers (De 
Clercq and Sapienza, 2006), we sought to 
minimize such problems related to the 
subjectivity of used measures using 
established scales of different conflict types 
and relying on interviews with the 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
48 
respondents to ensure better understanding 
of the underlying problems and conflictual 
issues in the VC-entrepreneur relationship. 
Nevertheless, the reader needs to realize 
that our findings could still be impacted by 
CEOs’ subjective views of conflict.  
Furthermore, the reader needs to take 
CEOs’ declarations made in response to our 
questions and open-ended comments on the 
survey, such as never to use any financial 
intermediaries in their new endeavors, with 
a grain of salt.  CEOs could be frustrated 
and disappointed with their VCs and report 
their unwillingness to ever form alliances 
with VCs in the future. Still, CEOs might 
change their mind once they receive an 
attractive offer from a VC.  
 
Furthermore, due to the cross-sectional 
nature of our data, any suggestions related 
to the causal nature of the observed 
relationship can only be speculative (Yli-
Renko, Sapienza, and Hay, 2001). We are 
hopeful, however, that future research will 
shed additional light on the examined 
situations. Specifically, due to the 
contradictory nature of information 
regarding VC-CEO conflict, its antecedents, 
dynamics and outcomes received from VCs 
(Higashide & Birley, 2002; Yitshaki, 2008; 
Forbes et al., 2010; Zacharakis et al., 2010), 
it would be useful, in our view, to organize 
VC-CEO panels that could discuss the 
divisive issues and seek to capture their 
multiple dimensions taking into account 
both the vantage points of investors (VCs, 
business angels and CVCs) and 
entrepreneurs. More attention could also be 
devoted to clarifying the nature of the 
outcome variables, and investigating the 
extent to which entrepreneurs’ (and VCs’) 
determinations regarding future partner 
choice made in the wake of conflict were 
actually realized.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
Amit, R., Brander, J., & Zott, C. 1998. Why  
do venture capital firms exist? 
Theory and Canadian evidence. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 
13(6), pp. 441–466. 
 
Amason, A. C., & Sapienza, H. 1997. The  
effects of top management team 
size and interaction norms on 
cognitive and affective conflict. 
Journal of Management, 23, pp. 
495–516. 
 
Amason, A., 1996. Distinguishing the  
effects of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict on strategic 
decision making: resolving a 
paradox for top management 
teams. Academy of. Management 
Journal, 39 (1), pp.123–148. 
 
Anderson, J.C. and Gerbing, D.W. 1988.  
Structural Equation Modeling in 
Practice: A Review and 
Recommending Two-Step 
Approach, Psychological Bulletin, 
103(3), pp. 411 – 423.  
 
Arthurs, J.D. & Busenitz, L.W. 2003. The  
boundaries and limitations of 
agency theory and stewardship 
theory in the venture 
capitalist/entrepreneur relationship. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 28(2), pp. 145–163. 
 
Barney, J.B., Busenitz, L.W., Fiet, J.O., &  
Moesel, D.D. 1996. New venture 
teams’ assessment of learning 
assistance from venture capital 
firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 11, pp. 257–272. 
 
 
 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
49 
Bell, J.R. 2009. Disproportionate  
distribution of stock ownership 
among initial founders in startup 
ventures: survey results and a 
ranking of factors. Journal of 
Small Business Strategy, 20(2), pp. 
1 – 22. 
 
Berg-Utby, T.; Sorheim, R., Widding, L. O.  
2007. Venture Capital, 9 (1), pp. 
23-41. 
 
Antonio J. Botelho, A.J., Jonathan, E.G.  
Brazilian high-tech entrepreneurs' 
perceptions and attitudes towards 
venture capital. International 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Management, 6 (4 -5), 
pp. 356 – 368. 
 
Boulding, K. 1962. Conflict and defense.  
New York: Harper and Row 
 
Busenitz, L.W., Fiet, J.O., & Moesel, D.D.  
2004. Reconsidering the venture 
capitalists’ “value-added” 
proposition: An interorganizational 
learning perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 19, pp. 787–
808. 
 
Cable, D.M. & Shane, S. 1997. A prisoner’s  
dilemma approach to entrepreneur-
venture capitalist relationships. 
Academy of Management Review, 
22, pp. 142–176. 
 
Cumming, D.2006. The determinants of  
venture capital portfolio size: 
empirical evidence. Journal of 
Business, 79, pp. 1083–1126. 
 
De Bettignies, J-E., Brander, J.A. 2007  
Financing entrepreneurship: Bank 
finance versus venture capital 
Journal of Business Venturing, 22 
(6),pp.808-832. 
 
De Clercq, D., Sapienza, H.J. 2005. When  
do venture capital firms learn from 
their investments? 
Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 29(4), pp. 517–535. 
 
De Clercq, D., Sapienza, H.J. 2006. Effects  
of relational capital and 
commitment on venture capitalists’ 
perception of portfolio company 
performance, 21, pp. 326 – 347. 
De Clercq, D., Castaner, X. 
 
Belausteguigoita, I. 2006. An  
attention-based view of intra-
organizational entrepreneurship. 
Academy of Management 
Proceedings. pp. 1 – 5. 
 
De Dreu, C., & Weingart, L. 2003. Task  
versus relationship conflict, team 
performance, and team member 
satisfaction. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 88, pp. 741–749. 
 
 
Deakins, D., O’Neill, E., & Mileham, P.  
2000. The role and influence of 
external directors in small, 
entrepreneurial companies: Some 
evidence on VC and non-VC 
appointed external directors. 
Venture Capital, 2(2), pp. 111–
127. 
 
Ehrlich, S.B., De Noble, A.F., Moore, T., &  
Weaver, R.R. (1994). After the 
cash arrives: A comparative study 
of venture capital and private 
investor involvement in 
entrepreneurial firms. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 9(1), pp. 67–
82. 
 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
50 
Elango, B., Fried, V.H., Hisrich, R.D., &  
Polonchek, A. 1995. How venture 
capital firms differ. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 10(2), pp. 
157–179. 
 
Fairchild, R., 2004. Financial contracting  
between managers and venture 
capitalists: the role of value-added 
services, reputation seeking, and 
bargaining power. Journal of 
Financial Research 27 (4), 481–
495. 
 
Flamholtz, E., Randle, Y., 2007. Growing  
Pains: Transitioning from an 
Entrepreneurship to a 
Professionally Managed Firm, 
John Wiley & Sons. San 
Francisco, CA. 
 
Florin, Juan. 2005. Is venture capital worth  
it? Effects on firm performance 
and founder returns. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 20 (1), pp. 
113-135. 
 
Flynn, D. 2001. Life cycles of new ventures  
organizations: Different factors 
affecting performance. Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship, 
6(1), pp. 41–58. 
 
Forbes, D.P., Korsgaard, M.A., Sapienza,  
H.J. 2010. Financing decisions as a 
source of conflict in venture 
boards. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 25 (6), pp. 579 – 592. 
 
Fornell, C. and Larcker, D. 1981.  
Evaluating structural equation 
models with unobservable 
variables and measurement error. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 
18, pp. 39 – 50. 
 
Fried, V.H., Bruton, G.D., & Hisrich, R.D.  
1998. Strategy and the board of 
directors in venture capital backed 
firms. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 13(6), pp. 493–503. 
 
Gabrielsson, J. & Huse, M. 2002. The  
venture capitalist and the board of 
directors in SMEs: Roles and 
processes. Venture Capital, 4(2), 
pp.125–146. 
 
Gomez Mejia, L.R., Balkin, D.B., &  
Welbourne, T.M. 1990. Influence 
of venture capitalists on high tech 
management. Journal of High 
Technology Management 
Research, 1(1), pp. 103–118. 
 
Gompers, P.A. 1995. Optimal investment,  
monitoring, and the staging of 
venture capital. Journal of 
Finance, 50, pp. 1461–1489. 
 
Gompers, P.A., Lerner, J.2004. The Venture  
Capital Cycle. MIT Press, 
Cambridge . 
Gorman, M., Sahlman, W. 1989. What do  
venture capitalists do? Journal of 
Business Venturing. 4, pp. 231–
248. 
 
Greer, Jehn, and Mannix, 2008. Conflict  
transformation: A longitudinal 
investigation of the relationships 
between different types of 
intragroup conflict and the 
moderating role of conflict 
resolution. Small Group Research, 
39, pp. 278 – 302. 
 
Hermalin, B.E. & Weisbach, M.S. 2003.  
Boards of directors as an 
endogenously determined 
institution: A survey of the 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
51 
economic literature. Economic 
Policy Review, 9(1), pp. 7–26. 
 
Higashide, H. & Birley, S. 2002. The  
consequences of conflict between 
the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneurial team in the United 
Kingdom from the perspective of 
the venture capitalist. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 17, pp. 59–81. 
 
Hillman, A.J., Cannella, A.A., & Paetzold,  
R.L. 2000. The resource 
dependence role of corporate 
directors. Journal of Management 
Studies, 37(2), pp. 235–255. 
 
Hellmann, T.1998. The allocation of control  
rights in venture capital contracts. 
Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 
pp. 57–76. 
 
Hellmann, T., Puri, M. 2002. Venture  
capital and the professionalization 
of start-up firms: empirical 
evidence. Journal of Finance 57, 
pp. 169–197. 
 
Hsu, D. 2004. What do entrepreneurs pay  
for venture capital affiliation? 
Journal of Finance 59(4), pp. 
1805–1844. 
 
Hu, L.T. and Bentler, P.M. 1999. Cut-off  
criteria of fit indices in co-variance 
structure analysis: Conventional 
criteria versus new alternatives. 
Structural Equation Modeling, 
6(1), pp. 1 – 55. 
 
Jääskeläinen, M., Maula, M., Seppä, T.  
2006. Allocation of attention and 
the performance of venture 
capitalist.Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice. 30 (2), pp. 186 – 
205. 
Jehn, K. 1995. A multimethod examination  
of the benefits and detriments of 
intragroup conflict. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 40, pp. 256–
282. 
 
Jehn, K. 1997. A qualitative analysis of  
conflict types and dimensions in 
organizational groups. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 
42, pp. 530–557. 
 
Jehn, K., Mannix, E. 2001. The dynamic  
nature of conflict: A longitudinal 
study of intragroup conflict and 
group performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44, pp. 238–
251. 
 
Kanniainen, V., Keuschnigg, C.2003. The  
optimal portfolio of start-up firms 
in venture capital finance. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 9, pp. 521–
534. 
 
Kanniainen, V., Keuschnigg, C. 2004. Start- 
up investment with scarce venture 
capital support. Journal of Banking 
Finance 28,  pp. 1935–1959. 
 
Kaplan, S.N., Strömberg, P.2004.  
Characteristics, contracts, and 
actions: evidence from venture 
capital analyses. Journal of 
Finance 59(5), pp. 2177–2206. 
 
Kelloway, E.K. 1998. Using LISREL for  
structural equation modeling: A 
researcher’s guide. Sage 
Publications. Thousand Oaks. 
 
 
Kortum, S., Lerner, J.2000. Assessing the  
contribution of venture capital to 
innovation. RAND Journal of 
Economics, 31, pp. 647–692. 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
52 
Landström, H. 1993. Agency theory and its  
application to small firms: 
Evidence from the Swedish 
venture capital market. Journal of 
Small Business Finance, 2(3), pp. 
203–218. 
 
MacMillan, I.C., Kulow, D.M., & Khoylian,  
R. 1989. Venture capitalists’ 
involvement in their investments: 
Extent and performance. Journal 
of Business Venturing, 4(1), pp. 
27–47. 
 
Matthews, C. H. Schenkel, M. T., Ford, M.  
W., Human, S. E. 2009. 
Comparing Nascent Entrepreneurs 
and Intrapreneurs and Expectations 
of Firm Growth Journal of Small 
Business Strategy, 20 (1), pp. 59 – 
68. 
 
Mooney, A. C., Holahan, P. J., Amason, A.  
C. 2007. Don't take it personally: 
Exploring cognitive conflict as a 
mediator of affective conflict. 
Journal of Management Studies, 
44(5), pp. 733-758. 
 
Pinkley, R. 1990. Dimensions of the  
conflict frame: Disputant 
interpretations of conflict. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 75, pp. 
117–128. 
 
Priem, R, Price, K. 1991. Process and  
outcome expectations for the 
dialectical inquiry, devil's 
advocacy, and consensus 
techniques of strategic decision 
making. Group and Organization 
Studies, 16, pp. 208-225. 
 
Rosenstein, J., Bruno, A.V., Bygrave, W.D.,  
& Taylor, N.T. 1993. The CEO, 
venture capitalists, and the board. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 
8(2), pp. 99–113. 
 
Ruhnka, J.C. & Young, J.E. 1987. A  
venture capital model of the 
development process for new 
ventures. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 2(2), pp. 167–184. 
 
Sahlman, W.A.1990. The structure and  
governance of venture capital 
organizations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 27, pp. 473–521. 
 
Sapienza, H. J., 1989, Variations in the  
venture capitalist-entrepreneur 
relations: antecedents and 
consequences. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, University of 
Maryland. 
 
Sapienza, H. J. and De Clercq, D., 2000,  
Venture capitalist-entrepreneur 
relationships in technologybased 
ventures. Enterprise and 
Innovation Management Studies, 
1, pp. 57 – 71. 
 
Sapienza, H.J. 1992. When do venture  
capitalists add value? Journal of 
Business Venturing, 7(1), pp. 9–27. 
 
Sapienza, H.J. & Gupta, A.K. 1994. The  
impact of agency risks and task 
uncertainty on venture capitalist– 
CEO interaction. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37(5), pp. 
1618–1632. 
 
 
Sapienza, H.J., Korsgaard, M.A., Goulet,  
P.K., & Hoogendam, J.P. 2000. 
Effects of agency risk and 
procedural justice on board 
processes in venture capital-
backed firms. Entrepreneurship 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
53 
and Regional Development, 12, 
pp. 331–351. 
 
Sapienza, H.J., Manigart, S., & Vermeir, W.  
1996. Venture capitalist 
governance and value added in 
four countries. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 11(6), pp. 439–469. 
 
Sapienza, H.J. & Timmons, J.A. 1989. The  
roles of venture capitalists in new 
ventures: What determines their 
importance? Academy of 
Management Best Papers 
Proceedings, pp. 74–78. 
 
Sapienza, H.: When do venture capitalists  
add value? 1992. Journal of 
Business Venturing. 7, pp. 9–27. 
Steier, L. & Greenwood, R. 1995. Venture  
capitalist relationships in the deal 
structuring and post-investment 
stages of new firm creation. 
Journal of Management Studies, 
32(3), pp. 337–357. 
 
Shepherd, D.A., Armstrong, M.J.,  
Levesque, M.2005. Allocation of 
attention within venture capital 
firms. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 116(2), pp. 
545–564. 
 
Ueda, M., 2004. Banks versus venture  
capital: project evaluation, 
screening, and expropriation. The 
Journal of Finance 59 (2), pp. 
601–621. 
 
Wijbenga, F.H., Postma, T.J.B.M., van  
Witteloostuijn, A., & Zwart, P.S. 
2003. Strategy and performance of 
new ventures: A contingency 
model of the role and influence of 
the venture capitalist. Venture 
Capital, 5(3), pp. 231–250. 
 
Yitshaki, R. 2008. Venture capitalist- 
entrepreneur conflicts: An 
exploratory study of determinants 
and possible resolutions. 
International Journal of Conflict 
Management, 19(3), pp. 262-292.  
 
Yli-Renko, H., Sapienza, H. J.; Hay, M.  
2001. The role of contractual 
governance flexibility in 
realizing the outcomes of key 
customer relationships, Journal Of 
Business Venturing, 16 (6), pp. 529 
– 555. 
 
Zacharakis, A., Erikson, T. and George, B.  
2010. Conflict between the VC and 
Entrepreneur: the Entrepreneur's 
Perspective. Venture Capital. 12 
(2), pp. 109-126.  
 
 
 
Dr. Dmitry Khanin graduated from the 
University of Maryland with a Ph.D. in 
strategic management in 2006. Dr. Khanin’s 
research is dedicated to various 
management disciplines including 
entrepreneurship, strategic management, 
family business, international business, 
organization theory, management education 
and business ethics. Dr. Khanin has 
published over twenty articles in such 
outlets as The Academy of Management 
Journal, Organization Science, Family 
Business Review, The Journal of Small 
Business Management, Venture Capital, 
Journal of Private Equity, Journal of 
International Entrepreneurship, Business 
Horizons, and others. Dr. Khanin is 
currently teaching organization theory and 
strategic management at Texas Tech 
University. 
 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                                         Vol. 23, No. 1 
54 
Dr. Ofir Turel is a professor of information 
systems and decision sciences at the 
College of Business and Economics, 
California State University, Fullerton. His 
research interests include a broad range of 
behavioral and managerial issues in various 
information systems contexts. He has 
published over 40 articles in journals such 
as MIS Quarterly, Journal of MIS, 
Communications of the ACM, European 
Journal of IS, Information & Management, 
Journal of Information Systems, Behavior 
& Information Technology, 
Telecommunications Policy, Group 
Decision and Negotiation, Family Business 
Review, and Communications in Statistics. 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
